Stanford

Profile vs. FBS, 2017

Farther out is better on every spoke. Dashed ring: the FBS median.

• EPA per play

  Expected points added on an average snap: how much each play moved the scoring odds.
  Offense+0.2084th
  Defense+0.1049th
• Success rate

  Share of snaps that stayed on schedule: half the yards needed on 1st down, 70% on 2nd, all of them on 3rd or 4th.
  Offense40.9%29th
  Defense44.9%32nd
• Explosiveness

  Average EPA on the successful snaps: how big the good plays were.
  Offense+1.4097th
  Defense+1.1276th
• Rushing EPA

  EPA per designed run.
  Offense+0.1785th
  Defense+0.0652nd
• Passing EPA

  EPA per pass play.
  Offense+0.2881st
  Defense+0.1448th
• Standard downs

  Success rate on downs where either a run or a pass makes sense, like 1st and 10 or 3rd and 2.
  Offense43.4%14th
  Defense48.6%35th
• Passing downs

  Success rate on downs that all but force a pass, like 2nd and 8 or longer, or 3rd and 5 or longer.
  Offense36.3%78th
  Defense35.2%30th
• Line yards

  Rushing yards per carry credited to the offensive line, weighting the first few yards most.
  Offense2.6824th
  Defense3.1421st
• Stuff rate

  Share of runs stopped at or behind the line of scrimmage.
  Offense22.6%16th
  Defense16.7%22nd
• Havoc

  Share of snaps with a tackle for loss, sack, forced fumble, interception or pass breakup.
  Offense19.1%15th
  Defense14.5%25th

Percentiles among the 130 FBS teams this season, where higher is better for the offense and the defense alike (a defense's numbers are what it allowed). The line in each bar is the FBS median. Garbage time excluded. Source: CollegeFootballData.

Drives vs. expectation, 2017

Every snap has an expected-points value: what a drive from that spot, down and distance is worth on average. A drive over expected beat its starting spot; defense counts what Stanford allowed, so lower is better. The adjusted number fits every team against the opponents it actually played, so it leans toward average early in a season. Ranks are among FBS teams.

Game by game

1. W
   RICE
2. L
   USC
3. L
   SDSU
4. W
   UCLA
5. W
   ASU
6. W
   UTAH
7. W
   ORE
8. W
   ORST
9. L
   WSU
10. W
    WASH
11. W
    CAL
12. W
    ND
13. L
    USC
14. L
    TCU

Bars above the line: better than expected for Stanford.

Players, 2017

1. K.J. CostelloQB223 plays · +0.268 pts/play · 69th of 226 QBs
   1.12WAR0.73 to 1.49
2. Bryce LoveRB253 plays · +0.207 pts/play · 1st of 352 RBs
   0.98WAR0.74 to 1.24
3. Keller ChrystQB116 plays · +0.137 pts/play · 156th of 226 QBs
   0.30WAR0.15 to 0.48
4. JJ Arcega-WhitesideWR69 plays · +0.173 pts/play · 25th of 426 WRs
   0.22WAR0.16 to 0.30
5. Jake BaileyP52 plays · +0.202 pts/play · 4th of 95 punters
   0.20WAR0.11 to 0.30
6. Jet TonerPK22 plays · +0.413 pts/play · 13th of 110 kickers
   0.17WAR0.10 to 0.24
7. Cameron ScarlettRB72 plays · +0.098 pts/play · 227th of 352 RBs
   0.13WAR0.07 to 0.19
8. Trenton IrwinWR62 plays · +0.099 pts/play · 146th of 426 WRs
   0.12WAR0.06 to 0.17

By position group, against FBS

Linemen and defenders are valued as units, in points per game against the median FBS unit, because play-by-play doesn't say who was on the field. Players are valued against a replacement-level backup, so the two aren't added together.

Wins above replacement credits each play's expected points to the players involved, adjusted for the opponent, and compares Stanford's players with a typical backup; 53 points make a win. Only snaps while the game was in doubt count, so a starter on a team that blows opponents out plays fewer of them: read value per play beside WAR. The line under each player (or the range on a phone) is the 90% interval. Ranks are among FBS teams and players. How this works

What it had and what it did, 2017

• Roster talent

  247Sports' talent composite: the recruiting ratings of every player on the roster, transfers included.
  81081014th of 130Roster talent: 810, 14th of 130 in FBS
• Recruiting

  Average 247Sports class score over this season's class and the three before it.
  24124118th of 130Recruiting: 241, 18th of 130 in FBS
• Returning production

  Share of last season's production (expected points added) by players still on the roster.
  60%60%71st of 128Returning production: 60%, 71st of 128 in FBS
• SP+ rating

  The result: Bill Connelly's opponent-adjusted rating, points per game better than an average FBS team.
  +15.8+15.820th of 128SP+ rating: +15.8, 20th of 128 in FBS

Ranks and bars among the 130 FBS teams with a talent rating this season, best first; the line in each bar is the FBS median.

Talent conversion

Conversion by season

Fourth-down calls vs. the numbers, 2017

Each real fourth down is valued three ways (go for it, kick, punt) from the score, clock and field position before the snap, using league-wide odds rather than Stanford's own. A call that differs gives up the gap to the best option; gaps under one point are close calls, and the 6 clear-cut ones account for 0.18 of the 0.22 expected wins. The model sees the situation, not the injury report, so a call it disagrees with can still be right. Ranks are among FBS teams; 1st gave up the least.

Costliest calls against the numbers

1. at SDSUQ3 4:51 4th & 1 at SDSU 4, down 6Kicked a field goal; the numbers favored going for it−5.8 pts
2. at WSUQ4 11:52 4th & 1 at STAN 47, up 4Punted; the numbers favored going for it−5.0 pts
3. at USCQ3 7:07 4th & 1 at STAN 26, down 3Punted; the numbers favored going for it−2.4 pts
4. at WSUQ4 4:21 4th & 7 at WSU 48, down 3Punted; the numbers favored going for it−2.2 pts
5. at WSUQ2 0:53 4th & 10 at WSU 37, down 7Punted; the numbers favored a field goal−1.5 pts
6. at SDSUQ2 2:16 4th & 2 at STAN 36, up 4Punted; the numbers favored going for it−1.1 pts
7. vs UCLAQ2 0:00 4th & 2 at UCLA 22, up 7Kicked a field goal; the numbers favored going for it (close call)−1.0 pts
8. vs ASUQ4 2:26 4th & 3 at ASU 4, up 7Kicked a field goal; the numbers favored going for it (close call)−0.8 pts

Record vs. expectation, 2017

56th of 130 FBS teams at beating the model's pregame expectations

Expected wins adds up Stanford's chance of winning each game as the model saw it at kickoff - a 70% favorite counts 0.7.

1. W

   RICE
2. L

   USC
3. L

   SDSU
4. W

   UCLA
5. W

   ASU
6. W

   UTAH
7. W

   ORE
8. W

   ORST
9. L

   WSU
10. W

    WASH
11. W

    CAL
12. W

    ND
13. L

    USC
14. L

    TCU

What moved it, 2017

Every game starts at Stanford's pregame chance; everything after that is the field. The model's own breakdown of each game's final play splits the on-field part by what drove it, and the parts add up exactly. How it works →

• Scoreboard+0.76
• Possession & field position−0.03
• Clock+0.08
• Timeouts+0.01
• Less the pregame edge, counted before kickoff−0.84

Game by game

• RICEW 62-7 at RICE98% → 100%Before kickoff +48 · On the field +2: Scoreboard +4
• USCL 24-42 at USC38% → 0%Before kickoff −12 · On the field −38: Scoreboard −39, Clock +2
• SDSUL 17-20 at SDSU76% → 6%Before kickoff +26 · On the field −70: Scoreboard −41, Clock −1
• UCLAW 58-34 vs UCLA67% → 99%Before kickoff +17 · On the field +33: Scoreboard +34, Clock +1
• ASUW 34-24 vs ASU86% → 97%Before kickoff +36 · On the field +11: Scoreboard +19, Timeouts +1
• UTAHW 23-20 at UTAH59% → 94%Before kickoff +9 · On the field +35: Scoreboard +43, Clock +3
• OREW 49-7 vs ORE76% → 100%Before kickoff +26 · On the field +24: Scoreboard +28
• ORSTW 15-14 at ORST89% → 77%Before kickoff +39 · On the field −12: Scoreboard +22, Clock +3
• WSUL 21-24 at WSU52% → 3%Before kickoff +2 · On the field −49: Scoreboard −37, Timeouts −2
• WASHW 30-22 vs WASH30% → 98%Before kickoff −20 · On the field +68: Scoreboard +45, Timeouts +2
• CALW 17-14 vs CAL86% → 90%Before kickoff +36 · On the field +4: Scoreboard +16, Timeouts +1
• NDW 38-20 vs ND43% → 99%Before kickoff −7 · On the field +56: Scoreboard +47, Timeouts +2
• USCL 28-31 at USC37% → 5%Before kickoff −13 · On the field −32: Scoreboard −32, Possession & field position −1
• TCUL 37-39 at TCU38% → 5%Before kickoff −12 · On the field −33: Scoreboard −32, Timeouts −2

Points of win probability, from Stanford's side.

Closest call

STAN 46-43 COLO (2023) - Stanford dropped to a 0.9% win probability before pulling it out.