Stanford

Profile vs. FBS, 2020

Farther out is better on every spoke. Dashed ring: the FBS median.

• EPA per play

  Expected points added on an average snap: how much each play moved the scoring odds.
  Offense+0.2587th
  Defense+0.297th
• Success rate

  Share of snaps that stayed on schedule: half the yards needed on 1st down, 70% on 2nd, all of them on 3rd or 4th.
  Offense49.4%88th
  Defense49.7%8th
• Explosiveness

  Average EPA on the successful snaps: how big the good plays were.
  Offense+1.1717th
  Defense+1.2358th
• Rushing EPA

  EPA per designed run.
  Offense+0.1675th
  Defense+0.2114th
• Passing EPA

  EPA per pass play.
  Offense+0.3278th
  Defense+0.406th
• Standard downs

  Success rate on downs where either a run or a pass makes sense, like 1st and 10 or 3rd and 2.
  Offense51.7%79th
  Defense53.1%12th
• Passing downs

  Success rate on downs that all but force a pass, like 2nd and 8 or longer, or 3rd and 5 or longer.
  Offense43.4%98th
  Defense40.7%2nd
• Line yards

  Rushing yards per carry credited to the offensive line, weighting the first few yards most.
  Offense3.1776th
  Defense3.425th
• Stuff rate

  Share of runs stopped at or behind the line of scrimmage.
  Offense16.3%83rd
  Defense17.5%27th
• Havoc

  Share of snaps with a tackle for loss, sack, forced fumble, interception or pass breakup.
  Offense12.9%91st
  Defense12.9%13th

Percentiles among the 127 FBS teams this season, where higher is better for the offense and the defense alike (a defense's numbers are what it allowed). The line in each bar is the FBS median. Garbage time excluded. Source: CollegeFootballData.

Drives vs. expectation, 2020

Every snap has an expected-points value: what a drive from that spot, down and distance is worth on average. A drive over expected beat its starting spot; defense counts what Stanford allowed, so lower is better. The adjusted number fits every team against the opponents it actually played, so it leans toward average early in a season. Ranks are among FBS teams.

Game by game

1. L
   ORE
2. L
   COLO
3. W
   CAL
4. W
   WASH
5. W
   ORST
6. W
   UCLA

Bars above the line: better than expected for Stanford.

Players, 2020

1. Davis MillsQB212 plays · +0.179 pts/play · 48th of 212 QBs
   0.71WAR0.38 to 1.13
2. Austin JonesRB142 plays · +0.165 pts/play · 38th of 338 RBs
   0.44WAR0.33 to 0.54
3. Simi FehokoWR49 plays · +0.205 pts/play · 26th of 409 WRs
   0.19WAR0.11 to 0.26
4. Michael WilsonWR22 plays · +0.167 pts/play · 218th of 409 WRs
   0.07WAR0.04 to 0.09
5. Connor WedingtonWR18 plays · +0.128 pts/play · 298th of 409 WRs
   0.04WAR0.02 to 0.06
6. Jet TonerPK10 plays · +0.165 pts/play · 59th of 97 kickers
   0.03WAR0.01 to 0.05
7. Ryan SanbornP21 plays · +0.055 pts/play · 44th of 77 punters
   0.02WAR0.00 to 0.05
8. Scooter HarringtonTE8 plays · +0.051 pts/play · 108th of 191 TEs
   0.01WAR0.00 to 0.02

By position group, against FBS

Linemen and defenders are valued as units, in points per game against the median FBS unit, because play-by-play doesn't say who was on the field. Players are valued against a replacement-level backup, so the two aren't added together.

Wins above replacement credits each play's expected points to the players involved, adjusted for the opponent, and compares Stanford's players with a typical backup; 53 points make a win. Only snaps while the game was in doubt count, so a starter on a team that blows opponents out plays fewer of them: read value per play beside WAR. The line under each player (or the range on a phone) is the 90% interval. Ranks are among FBS teams and players. How this works

What it had and what it did, 2020

• Roster talent

  247Sports' talent composite: the recruiting ratings of every player on the roster, transfers included.
  80280220th of 127Roster talent: 802, 20th of 127 in FBS
• Recruiting

  Average 247Sports class score over this season's class and the three before it.
  23323322nd of 127Recruiting: 233, 22nd of 127 in FBS
• Returning production

  Share of last season's production (expected points added) by players still on the roster.
  68%68%54th of 127Returning production: 68%, 54th of 127 in FBS
• SP+ rating

  The result: Bill Connelly's opponent-adjusted rating, points per game better than an average FBS team.
  +1.6+1.658th of 127SP+ rating: +1.6, 58th of 127 in FBS

Ranks and bars among the 127 FBS teams with a talent rating this season, best first; the line in each bar is the FBS median.

Talent conversion

Conversion by season

Fourth-down calls vs. the numbers, 2020

Each real fourth down is valued three ways (go for it, kick, punt) from the score, clock and field position before the snap, using league-wide odds rather than Stanford's own. A call that differs gives up the gap to the best option; gaps under one point are close calls, and the 2 clear-cut ones account for 0.02 of the 0.04 expected wins. The model sees the situation, not the injury report, so a call it disagrees with can still be right. Ranks are among FBS teams; 1st gave up the least.

Costliest calls against the numbers

1. at ORSTQ2 7:04 4th & 2 at STAN 49, down 8Punted; the numbers favored going for it−1.3 pts
2. at CALQ4 15:00 4th & 11 at CAL 34, up 7Punted; the numbers favored a field goal−1.1 pts
3. at UCLAQ2 5:22 4th & 9 at UCLA 33, up 10Punted; the numbers favored a field goal (close call)−0.6 pts
4. at WASHQ2 0:25 4th & 4 at WASH 37, up 18Went for it; the numbers favored a field goal (close call)−0.4 pts
5. at CALQ2 14:55 4th & 3 at CAL 9, down 7Kicked a field goal; the numbers favored going for it (close call)−0.3 pts
6. at OREQ2 12:06 4th & 3 at ORE 23, tiedKicked a field goal; the numbers favored going for it (close call)−0.3 pts
7. at OREQ2 5:04 4th & 13 at ORE 38, tiedPunted; the numbers favored a field goal (close call)−0.1 pts
8. at CALQ1 10:32 4th & 6 at CAL 39, down 7Punted; the numbers favored going for it (close call)−0.1 pts

Record vs. expectation, 2020

20th of 127 FBS teams at beating the model's pregame expectations

Expected wins adds up Stanford's chance of winning each game as the model saw it at kickoff - a 70% favorite counts 0.7.

1. L

   ORE
2. L

   COLO
3. W

   CAL
4. W

   WASH
5. W

   ORST
6. W

   UCLA

What moved it, 2020

Every game starts at Stanford's pregame chance; everything after that is the field. The model's own breakdown of each game's final play splits the on-field part by what drove it, and the parts add up exactly. How it works →

• Scoreboard−0.08
• Possession & field position+0.01
• Clock+0.03
• Timeouts+0.27
• Less the pregame edge, counted before kickoff−0.20

Game by game

• OREL 14-35 at ORE23% → 1%Before kickoff −27 · On the field −22: Scoreboard −25, Clock −1
• COLOL 32-35 vs COLO77% → 6%Before kickoff +27 · On the field −71: Scoreboard −54, Clock −4
• CALW 24-23 at CAL52% → 46%Before kickoff +2 · On the field −6: Scoreboard +13, Possession & field position −4
• WASHW 31-26 at WASH23% → 95%Before kickoff −27 · On the field +72: Scoreboard +55, Clock +3
• ORSTW 27-24 at ORST63% → 93%Before kickoff +13 · On the field +31: Scoreboard +42, Clock +3
• UCLAW 48-47 at UCLA33% → 34%Before kickoff −17 · On the field +1: Scoreboard −39, Timeouts +27

Points of win probability, from Stanford's side.

Closest call

STAN 46-43 COLO (2023) - Stanford dropped to a 0.9% win probability before pulling it out.